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Demand-Side Determinants of Wage Inequality
Corey Lorenzen
ABSTRACT. Since 1979, there has been an increasing gap in earnings between skilled and
unskilled workers. Supply-side factors were shown to offset the demand shifts in the
1970’s, but the supply of college graduates stabilized during the 1980’s. As the wage
inequality began to grow, focus turned to demand-side factors that contributed to the wage
inequality. Three main factors were highlighted: changes in the industrial structure,
international trade, and increased investment in technology. These factors expanded the
relative demand for skilled workers, increasing the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers. Increased educational subsidies is recommended as the best policy response.

Introduction
Since the late 1970’s there has been growing wage inequality between
unskilled and skilled workers. In 1980 college graduates earned 41
percent more than high school graduates. However, in 1995 college graduates earned 62 percent more [Acemoglu, 1998, 1055]. This phenomenon
can be explained with a basic supply and demand model. Demand for
skilled workers has risen relative to the demand for unskilled workers,
while the supply of each of these groups has stayed relatively stable.
Therefore, wages for skilled workers have increased relative to those of
unskilled workers.
The major effects of the wage differentials are social. Inequality in
earnings may undermine the ideals of political and legal equality, and
may affect public health [Burtless, 1999, 32]. Burtless [1999, 32] argues
that inequality has produced wider discrepancies in political influence and
legal bargaining power. In 1979, the 95th percentile of income
distribution earned three times the median income, and thirteen times the
income of those in the 5th percentile. In 1996, the 95th percentile made
four times the median income and twenty-three times the 5th percentile
[Burtless, 1999, 32]. If nothing else, increased wage inequality has
contributed to Americans’ dwindling confidence that elected officials care
about the ordinary citizen, and has contributed to some of the apathy in
the political process. As people at the high end of the income scale
continue to make more than even those with a median income, people
with low-to-upper middle class incomes increasingly feel they do not have
a say in the political or legal system. For example, in 1960, 25 percent of
Americans agreed with the statement “I don’t think public officials care
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much about what people like me think.” By 1996, 60 percent agreed with
this statement [Burtless, 1999, 32]. On the other hand, one could argue
that the conditions of public apathy towards the political and legal process
are even present in people at the higher-end of the income scale. The
argument presented in this paper is that as the gap in earnings among
workers with the highest and lowest income grows, the power in the legal
and political process becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of
a few. Therefore, wage inequality has helped contribute to the feelings
of apathy in the U.S. In addition, inequality may also affect public health.
According to Burtless [1999,33], “low-income Americans have death
rates comparable to those in Bangladesh, one of the world’s poorest
countries.” These problems with social inequality and public health
should lead people to be concerned with the negative side-effects and
causes of wage inequality. This paper will examine the demand-side
causes of the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.

Background
As Levy and Murnane [1992, 1333] state, “1979 marked the beginning of
a sharp acceleration in the growth of earnings inequality.” Until 1973,
income inequality was generating little interest because real earnings were
growing for all segments of society. In 1973, the official poverty rate was
at a post-war low of 11.1 percent, and median income for 25-34 year-old
men with a high school education was at a post-war high of $24,500
[Levy and Murnane, 1992, 1341-1342]. From 1973 to 1979, the
difference between the incomes of college graduates and high school
graduates fell. In 1970, college graduates earned 55 percent more than
high school graduates, but in 1980 this figure had fallen to 41 percent
[Acemoglu, 1998, 1055]. However, by 1982, interest in the wage inequality had risen. In addition, civilian unemployment averaged 9.7
percent and manufacturing employment was 11 percent below its 1979
level [Levy and Murnane, 1992, 1346]. Also, real wages were growing
very slowly during this period, so that workers were not only worse off
in relative terms, but in absolute terms as well [Levy and Murnane, 1992,
1351]. As Levy and Murnane [1992, 1346] state, “the rich were getting
richer and the poor were getting poorer, the type of inequality that would
attract general interest.” Much of the literature of the period focused on
demand side factors, most notably the loss of the middle class due to
“deindustrialization.” This theory stated that labor was forced from the
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manufacturing sector, where there are many jobs that pay middle class
wages, into the service sector with a few high paying jobs, and many low
earnings jobs [Levy and Murnane, 1992, 1347]. By 1988, most studies
concluded that earnings inequality was growing and that it was being
driven more by growing wage rate inequality among both men and
women, than by cyclical movement in hours worked [Levy and Murnane,
1992, 1351]. Also, the studies were beginning to look at the causes of
inward demand shifts, such as deindustrialization, international trade, and
technology [Levy and Murnane, 1992, 1352-1353].

Supply-Side Effects on Wage Inequality
Supply-side factors had a major impact in the 1970’s. The number of 2534 year old male college graduates increased by 85 percent, from 1.196
million in 1971 to 2.212 million in 1979. In comparison, 25-34 year old
male high school graduates increased by 13 percent, from 4.151 million
to 4.695 million. In comparison, women in the same age groups increased
by 151 percent for college graduates and 66 percent for high school
graduates [Levy and Murnane, 1992, 1358]. This increase in the number
of college graduates was due mainly to demographics, as most of the
“baby-boom” generation came of age [Kodrzycki, 1996, 13]. The
dramatic increase in the supply of educated workers was the single most
important factor contributing to the reduction in earnings inequality [Levy
and Murnane, 1992, 1358]. In the 1980’s, the influx of college educated
workers slowed relative to the 1970’s, boosting the returns to schooling
[Kodrzycki, 1996, 13]. Between 1979 and 1987, the 25-34 year-old male
college graduates labor force grew by 32 percent, compared to 40 percent
for male high school graduates [Levy and Murnane, 1992, 1359]. Levy
and Murnane [1992. 1359] state two reasons for the decline in the relative
supply of college graduates: the decline in the returns to education in the
1970’s, and a move to a volunteer army which made it unnecessary to go
to college to avoid the draft. The effects of supply-side determinants had
its major influence in the seventies by offsetting the effects of increased
relative demand of college graduates. As Autor, Katz, and Krueger state,
...the increased rate of growth of relative demand for college
graduates beginning in the 1970’s did not lead to an increase in
the college/high school wage differential until the 1980’s because
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the growth in the supply of college graduates increased even
more sharply in the 1970’s before returning to historical levels in
the 1980’s. [1998, 1169]

Hence, the supply-side determinants had a major impact on the wage
inequality in the 1970’s, but the overall effect that supply-side factors had
on the acceleration of inequality that occurred from 1979 on was minimal.

Demand-Side Effects on Wage Inequality
There are two general demand effects on wage inequality. There has been
an increase in the demand for skilled workers, and a decrease in the
demand for unskilled workers. Many causes of these demand shifts have
been examined, such as unions, dollar exchange rates, technological
changes, shifts within and between industries, and international trade.
For this paper, we will focus on the three major demand effects: shifts
within and between industries, international trade, and technological
change.
INDUSTRIAL MIX
Two changes in the industrial mix have had an impact on wage
inequality. First, there are changes “between industries.” Manufacturing
industries, which employ more less-educated workers, have become less
important in the economy, and service industries, which employ more
college graduates, have become more important [Kodrzycki, 1996, 14].
Second, changes within industries to more highly educated workers have
increased the demand for skilled workers [Kodrzycki, 1996, 14]. These
changes in the structure of industries will be shown to have a major
impact in the demand for workers.
Changes in the importance of different industries have had a
significant effect on the increased relative demand for highly skilled
workers. As Kodrzycki [1996, 14] states, “19 percent of the increased
demand for highly educated workers is due to the importance in the
growth of service industries.” The decline in the manufacturing sector
has an impact on the wage inequality because this is where many of the
less-educated workers have traditionally worked [Kodrzycki, 1996, 14].
Therefore, the importance of industries in the U.S. economy has shifted
from a low-skilled sector to a high-skilled sector, increasing the relative
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demand of highly skilled (college educated) workers. In a supply-demand
model, this will result in an outward shift in the demand of skilled
workers, increasing the wages of these workers relative to unskilled
workers.
Higher relative demand for college educated workers versus less
educated workers across all industries has had a major impact on the
wages for skilled workers. As Kodrzycki [1996, 14] states, “81 percent
of the increased relative demand for skilled workers can be explained by
changes within industries.” These “within industry” changes in demand
have been correlated with industry investment in computers and research
and development [Kodrzycki, 1996, 14]. Technological change has
increased the value of highly skilled workers because workers are needed
who can operate these new technologies. As a result, the demand of
skilled workers shifts outward and results in a growing inequality
between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers.
This section has showed that the industrial structure in the United
States has shifted from a manufacturing sector to a service sector, and
technology has changed the focus to a more skilled labor force. These
two occurrences have resulted in an increase in the demand for skilled
workers relative to unskilled workers. Later these shifts in the industrial
structure will be shown to be a result of international trade and
technological change.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Many economists argue that trade with less-developed countries has
resulted in decreasing the demand for unskilled workers domestically by
reducing demand for domestically manufactured goods. Freeman
[1995,21] provides a good summary of the theory behind this argument.
The economy of a developed country, in this case the U.S., will shift
toward the production of commodities made by skilled workers. As a
result, the U.S. will then import the commodities that are made by lessskilled workers from a less-developed country (LDC). This assumes that
the U.S. has a high concentration of skilled workers, and the lessdeveloped country has relatively more less-skilled workers. The result of
this trade is that the demand for less-skilled labor in the U.S. and skilled
labor in the LDCs falls, and their wages will be reduced. Also, the
demand for skilled labor in the U.S. and unskilled labor in the LDC’s
increases, and their wages will increase. Therefore, trade would result in
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widening wage inequality within the U.S.
There has been some debate about the impact of trade on wage
inequality. However, as Wood [1995, 58] states, there are five points that
most economists agree upon. First, the demand for unskilled labor has
fallen relative to the demand for skilled labor in the U.S., and this has
increased the wage inequality. Second, employment in manufacturing has
fallen faster than expected. Third, these changes in labor markets have
coincided with the rapid growth of imports from “low-skill-intensive”
manufacturers from developing countries. Fourth, the other major
alternative explanation to the wage inequality is technological change,
since the diffusion of computers has also coincided with the growth in
inequality. Finally, most empirical studies show that trade has some
impact on the wage inequality. These points should lead one to believe
trade has had an impact on wage inequality.
Trade is now opening up between countries as a result of many
factors. First, there has been a substantial reduction in trade barriers, as
seen in such international treaties as NAFTA, and GATT [Freeman, 1995,
20]. Also, developing countries have switched their development
strategies to a more export-oriented trade policy [Wood, 1995, 61]. In
addition, investment by developed countries in the manufacturing sectors
of developing countries has helped the ability of developing countries to
compete on the global market [Freeman, 1995, 20]. Diffusion of
technology has also put developing countries on the same production
frontier as developed countries [Freeman, 1995, 20]. Finally, as Wood
[1995, 61] states, “international transport and telecommunications have
become much cheaper, quicker, and of better quality.” Therefore, the
growing wage inequality has coincided with the opening up of trade.
The most common indicator that is used to measure increased trade,
or globalization of trade, is the ratio of exports plus imports to the gross
domestic product (GDP) [Freeman, 1995, 19]. The rise in U.S.
globalization can be seen by using this indicator. In 1970, this ratio was
0.11, or 11 percent of GDP. In 1990, the ratio was 0.22, or 22 percent of
GDP [Freeman, 1995, 19]. In addition, the ratio of U.S. imports from
less-developed countries rose from 14 percent in 1970, to 35 percent in
1990 [Freeman, 1995, 19]. These measures show that the U.S. is trading
more, and a higher proportion of this trade is with developing countries.
Now the question is what is the impact of this increased trade with
developing countries on wage inequality. Wood [1995, 64] provides the
strongest argument for the impact of trade. Wood uses factor content
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analysis, which involves figuring how much skilled and unskilled labor
is used in producing a country’s exports, and how much would have been
used to produce its imports. The difference is interpreted as the impact
of trade on demand. Wood’s [1995, 66] results show that the relative
demand for unskilled workers is reduced by 22 percent. The demand for
skilled workers is shown to increase by 0.3 percent, while the demand for
unskilled workers decreased by 21.5 percent. Wood’s results imply that
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the U.S. has
widened because the demand for skilled workers has remained fairly
constant, while the demand for unskilled workers has fallen. While this
contradicts Freeman’s theory that as a result of international trade,
domestic wages for skilled and unskilled workers will move in opposite
directions, the result is still that trade causes the wage gap to widen. As
Richardson [1995, 51] states, “trade is a moderate contributing source of
income inequality, it may not overshadow other sources, but it cannot be
shrugged away.”
Several arguments have been made against the impact of trade on
wage inequality. First, the manufacturing sector is relatively small,
accounting for less than 20 percent of U.S. employment, which limits the
number of jobs affected by trade. Also, some of the trade has been with
developed countries, limiting how much U.S. wages would adjust
downward for unskilled workers [Kodrzycki, 1996, 15-16]. Finally, if
trade has an impact, prices of goods produced by unskilled workers
domestically would be expected to fall. However, despite the criticism,
the evidence previously presented is too significant to discard. Freeman
[1995, 30] concludes that “trade matters, but it is neither all that matters
nor the primary cause of the observed changes.” This paper comes to the
same conclusion, that trade does have an impact on wage inequality, but
this impact is limited and other factors, like technology, can also be
attributed as causes of wage inequality.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The third and final demand-side determinant of wage inequality is
technological change. As Kodrzycki [1996, 16] states, “there has been a
general shift in demand in favor of workers with relatively high
intellectual ability, opposed to manual ability.” The conclusion that
technology is a determinant of the wage inequality is based on the fact
that the earnings gap has widened, and investment in technology across
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industries appears correlated to this earnings gap. According to
Kodrzycki [1996,16], industry investment in high-tech capital may be
able to account for as much as 60 percent of the explained variation in the
wage gap. Doms, Dunne, and Troske [1997, 259-260] explain the theory
behind the technology argument quite well. The technologies they
examine are “primarily used in the design and fabrication of products and
the control of machinery and information on the factory floor” [Doms,
Dunne, and Troske, 1997, 259-260]. These technologies increase the
level of automation in the factory. Workers use the new technologies
through computers, keyboards, pointing devices, and video display
terminals. Therefore, workers should have at a minimum, reasonable
language skills, reading skills, some math skills, and reasonable skills to
run the automated capital. As a result, firms with more automated
technology will employ more educated, and thus, more-skilled workers.
In addition, introduction of the new technology will affect the
organization of the workforce. For example, with the new technology,
employees may be able to perform tasks that previously took many people
to perform. Therefore, skilled workers are replacing less-skilled workers
like assemblers and operators. In addition, with the increased technology,
a significant skilled support staff must be employed to install and
maintain the technology. Therefore, the introduction of new technologies
in a firm has resulted in the replacement of less skilled workers with
skilled engineers and support staff. These changes increase both the
relative demand for skilled workers, and the wage inequality.
Investment in new technologies has risen over the last few decades.
In 1979, computer investment per worker was around $100. In 1992, the
computer investment per worker was around $1000 [Howell, 1995, 28].
Most of this investment has been directed toward college graduates, or
skilled workers. In 1993, only 34.6 percent of high school graduates used
computers, contrasted to 70.2 percent of college graduates [Acemoglu,
1998, 1076]. In addition, as the number of new technologies in a firm
increase, the percent of college educated workers rises. For example,
only 9.4 percent of workers in firms that use less than four technologies
have college degrees. In comparison, 33.1 percent of the workers in
plants with thirteen or more technologies have college degrees [Doms et
al., 1997, 261]. Doms, Dunne, and Troske [1997, 263] show that more
nonproduction and production workers in firms have a college education
when more technology is used, and the number of workers in skilled
occupations rises significantly when the number of technologies

Lorenzen: Demand-Side Determinants

35

employed by a firm increases. The percent of nonproduction workers
with at least a college degree increases from 24.1 percent with four
technologies used, to 53.9 percent when 13 or more technologies are used.
Similarly, the percent of production workers with at least some college
education increases from 21.2 percent when only four technologies are
used, to 34.9 percent when more than 13 technologies are used. Their
research also shows that industry-level investment in “high technology”
capital goods, such as computers, is positively correlated with the
educational attainment of production and nonproduction workers in the
industry. Firms that have 10 or more technologies employ 11.7 percent
more nonproduction workers with college degrees than firms that use zero
to three technologies. In comparison, firms with more than 10
technologies employ 9.9 percent more production workers with some
college education than firms with zero to three technologies. These
numbers show that technological investment is on the rise, and with this
increase comes an increase in the demand for workers with the skills to
operate the new technology.
There are two main theories that link the increased investment in
technology to the differences in wages between skilled and unskilled
labor. One focus is on the complementarity between skills and firm
production choices.
For example, Doms, Dunne, and Troske
[1997,268,281-282] argue that operations with more educated workers
adopt new technologies sooner and the decision to adopt new systems
then increases further the demand for skilled workers. In other words, the
most technologically advanced firms paid their workers higher wages
prior to adopting the new technologies, and these firms had high
productivity before and after adopting the new technology. Therefore,
firms with high concentrations of technology will remain at the forefront,
and will continue to demand the most skilled workers. This will maintain
the high wages (demand) of the skilled workers relative to the unskilled.
The other argument is that the direction of technical change is determined
by the size of the market for different innovations [Acemoglu, 1998,
1076]. As Acemoglu [1998, 1076] argues, with more skilled workers, the
market for technologies that complement the skills of these workers is
large. As a result, more technologies will be invented, and they will be
complementary to skills. In other words, as the concentration of skilled
workers increases, research and development will become more intense,
pushing up the relative demand for skills [Machin and Van Reenen,
1998]. Therefore, wages for the skilled workers will increase relative to
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that of the unskilled worker.
Two qualifications on the technological change argument need to be
addressed. Some economists argue that the demand for high-skilled
workers rose before computer usage became widespread, and that
institutional changes explain the differences in earnings [Kodrzycki,
1996, 16]. The data identified in this paper show a correlation between
firms with numerous technologies implemented and an educated
workforce, which would refute this argument. However, this argument
does show that other explanations for wage inequality, like international
trade, are likely to exist. In addition, the argument that an increase in
demand before computers became widespread did not result in the wage
inequality, would back up the theory that increases in the supply of
college-educated workers in the 1970’s offset the increases in demand.
A more general criticism is that more research is needed that looks at the
impacts of specific types of technological change. The studies in this
paper examine only general measures of technology. More specific
studies may give a better understanding of the effects of technological
change.
LINKS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL MIX, INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The determinants mentioned have had the largest impact on the
demand for workers in the U.S., and are interconnected to have one major
impact on wage inequality. The structure of the industrial mix is
connected to both international trade and technological change.
International trade shifts the focus of the economy “between” industries,
from the manufacturing industry to the service industry, where skilled
employees are concentrated. Technological change shifts the focus
“within” industries to nonproduction occupations that take advantage of
skilled workers. As Richardson [1995, 49] states, “Technological
investment explains some of the shift toward nonproduction workers
within plants, but exporting explains the shifts between plants.” In
addition, international trade with less-developed countries will focus the
direction of technical change. If the U.S. is able to import the goods that
are produced by unskilled workers, research and development can be
focused in the production of goods and services that are produced by
skilled workers [Acemoglu, 1998,1074]. Therefore, the effects of
technological change, international trade, and the structure of the
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industrial mix all contribute together to increase the demand of the skilled
worker relative to the unskilled worker. As a result, demand-side factors
have created an increasing gap in earnings between the skilled and
unskilled worker.

Policies
As stated in the introduction, inequalities in earnings may undermine the
ideals of political and legal equality, and may have a negative effect on
public health. Defenders of the U.S. economic and political system point
out that inequality plays a crucial role in creating incentives for people to
improve their situations through saving, hard work, and additional
schooling [Burtless, 1999, 33]. These defenders argue that wage
inequalities must widen in order for people to realize they need to save,
work more, change jobs, or acquire more education. Therefore, the poor
may be able to earn higher absolute earnings in a society that allows the
wage gap to widen, rather than one where laws keep the wage gap very
small [Burtless, 1999, 33]. However, for low-income residents of the
United States this higher absolute income theory has not come true
because their absolute real incomes have actually fallen. Since lowincome residents are not enjoying increases in their situation, either in
relative or absolute terms, policy makers are beginning to look at the
social, legal, and health consequences of wage inequalities that were
discussed in the introduction. As a result, policy responses need to be
examined.
In almost every piece of literature cited in this paper, a section on
policy responses is available. One option would be to raise trade barriers
so as to protect unskilled workers. However, every piece of literature
regards this as a bad idea. As Richardson [1995, 51]states, restricting
trade is a bad idea because “trade is also a stimulus to growth, and the
incomes of both poor and rich can rise (in absolute terms) because of it.”
The other response ignore the demand-side determinants and looks at
increasing the supply of skilled workers through increased education and
training [Wood, 1995, 78]. However, as Wood [1995, 78] points out, this
strategy will take years or even a decade or two for the results to show up.
My opinion is that this is the best response because there can be little
objection. I would argue these policies would need to be implemented
with the youth. Few could argue against the idea that children of equal
abilities should be offered the same educational opportunities. This
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should be done by expanding the availability of loans, grants, and
scholarships to low-income students. As Bishop [1996, 133] states,
it would not be a tragedy if a major increase in college
completion rates lowered the wage premium paid business B.A.s
over high school graduates to only 100 percent rather than 200
percent. Indeed competitiveness would improve and income
inequality would decline.
Wood [1995, 78] argues that while we wait for these measures to be
implemented, other measures are needed. Wood [1995, 78] continues that
“subsidies are needed to boost the living standards of workers who take
low-paying jobs, in the form of tax cuts, cash supplements to wages, and
better public services.” However, subsidies to low-income people is more
controversial than the idea of subsidies for education. Those against this
policy would argue that over time, with the increasing returns to
education, people will educate themselves on their own in order to
improve their situation. Also, economists argue that subsidies will ease
the situation of the unskilled worker, slowing the supply response [Wood,
1995, 78]. As a result, these subsidies are unlikely to make it through the
political process. Hence, the most plausible option available would be
increasing educational opportunities through increased subsidies to
students. In the meantime, society has to hope that the economy will
adjust for the wage gap on its own through residents seeking more
education because of the increased returns to capital.

Conclusion
Since 1979, there has been an increasing gap in earnings between skilled
and unskilled workers. The basic explanation for the wage inequality has
been that the relative demand for skilled workers has risen, while the
relative supply of skilled workers has remained constant. Supply-side
factors were shown to offset increased demand in the 1970’s. Therefore,
the differential in earnings actually fell during this period. However, due
to decreasing returns to education, and a move to a volunteer army, the
supply of college graduates stabilized during the 1980’s. As the wage
inequality began to grow in the eighties, focus turned to the demand-side
factors that contributed to the wage inequality. Three main factors were
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highlighted. International trade and technological change, and their
impact on the structure of industries were shown to have the major
impacts on wage inequality. These factors expanded the relative demand
for skilled workers, causing the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers to rise. The policy response that has been recommended would
be increased subsidies to students wishing to further their education so
each student has the same educational opportunities, no matter what their
income or the income of their parents is.
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